Lecture Notes on the Optimizer's Curse

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A Note to the Student: These lecture notes are not a substitute for the thorough study of articles and books. These notes are no more than an aid in following the lectures.

\S Sources:

• Smith, James E. and Robert L. Winkler, 2006, The optimizer's curse: Skepticism and postdecision surprise in decision analysis, *Management Science*, Vol. 52, No. 3, pp.311–322.

• Thaler, Richard H., 1992, *The Winner's Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life*, Princeton University Press.

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1 Probabilistic Analysis

1.1 Formulation

 $\S n$ alternatives: $1, \ldots, n$.

- $v_i =$ **Unknown** true value of *i*th alternative. $v = (v_1, ..., v_n)^T$.
- $\tilde{v}_i =$ **Known** noisy estimated value of *i*th alternative. $\tilde{v} = (\tilde{v}_1, \dots, \tilde{v}_n)^T$.

§ Regret:

- Choose alternative *i*, expecting \tilde{v}_i .
- Obtain realized outcome v_i .
- Regret, or disappointment: ṽ_i − v_i.
 Positive regret if v_i < ṽ_i.

§ Unbiased estimates:

$$\mathbf{E}(\tilde{v}_i|v) = v_i \tag{1}$$

Thus, for any choice *i*, the expected regret is zero:

$$\mathbf{E}(\widetilde{v}_i - v_i | v) = 0 \tag{2}$$

This is because:

$$E(\tilde{v}_i|v) = v_i = E(v_i|v)$$
(3)

§ Outcome optimization:

$$i^{\star} = \arg\max_{i} \widetilde{v}_{i} \tag{4}$$

 \S **Question:** Is this a good, sensible strategy?

\S Expect positive regret from $\widetilde{v}_{i^{\star}}.$

- Example:
 - \circ Suppose $E(v_i) = \mu$, a constant, for all *i*.
 - \circ Anticipate $E(\tilde{v}_{i^{\star}}) > \mu$ since:
 - $-\tilde{v}_{i^{\star}}$ is the maximum of *n* estimates.
 - $-\tilde{v}_{i^{\star}}$ will tend to be on upper tail. (Example: best grade of n exams.)
 - Hence $E(\tilde{v}_{i^{\star}} v_{i^{\star}}) = E(\tilde{v}_{i^{\star}}) \mu > 0.$
- Meaning: On average, estimated outcome optimum:
 - Is over-estimate.
 - \circ Has positive regret.
- We will explore this more deeply later.

1.2 Simple Examples

 \S We consider some simple examples from Smith and Winkler (2006).

1.2.1 3 Zero-Mean Alternatives

 \S The true values, v_i , all precisely equal zero. They are not random variables.

§ The estimates, \tilde{v}_i , are all $\mathcal{N}(0,1)$. See fig. 1.




Figure 1: Smith and Winkler (2006), fig. 1.

 \S The mean of the distribution of $\widetilde{v}_{i^{\star}}$ is 0.85.

(We will understand this more deeply later.)

§ Thus the average regret, $E(\tilde{v}_{i^{\star}} - 0)$, is 0.85.

§ More generally, suppose:

- The true values are $v_i = \mu$ for all *i*. They are not random variables.
- The estimates, \tilde{v}_i , are all $\mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2)$.
- Then $E(v_{i^{\star}}) = \mu + 0.85\sigma$ which is the average regret.

1.2.2 *n* Zero-Mean Alternatives


§ **lf:**

- $v_i = 0$ for all i = 1, ..., n (not random variable).
- $\tilde{v}_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1)$ for all $i = 1, \ldots, n$.

 \S Then the regret increases as *n* increases. See fig. 2.

This makes sense:

- $\circ \tilde{v}_{i^{\star}}$ is the maximum of *n* estimates.
- \circ This maximum tends to increase as n increases.






Figure 2: Smith and Winkler (2006), fig. 2.

1.2.3 3 Different Alternatives

§ The true values are $v_i = -\Delta$, 0, Δ . Not random variables.

§ The estimates are unbiased normal with unit standard deviation: $\tilde{v}_i \sim \mathcal{N}(v_i, 1)$.

 \S As the alternatives become more different, we should expect $\tilde{v}_{i^{\star}}$ to become a better bet. See fig. 3.

Distribution of maximum value estimate Probability of Expected Δ disappointment correct choice Distribution of value 0.0 0.85 0.33 estimates 0.66 0.42 0.2 $(\Delta = 0.5)$ 0.50 0.51 0.4 0.39 0.59 0.6 0.66 0.8 0.30 0.22 0.73 1.0 0.78 1.2 0.17 0.83 1.4 0.12 0.10 0.87 1.6 0.90 1.8 0.07 2.0 0.05 0.92 2.2 0.03 0.94 0.02 0.95 2.4 2.6 0.01 0.97 -2 0 1 2 -1 2.8 0.01 0.98 -3 з 3.0 0.00 0.98

Figure 3 The Distribution of Maximum Value Estimates with Separation Between Alternatives

Figure 3: Smith and Winkler (2006), fig. 3.

1.3 Distribution of $\tilde{v}_{i^{\star}}$

 \S In this section we derive and study the distribution of $\tilde{v}_{i^{\star}}$.

- We will understand why its mean exceeds $E(\tilde{v}_i)$.
- Source: DeGroot, Morris H., 1986, Probability and Statistics, 2nd ed., Addison-Wesley,

Reading, MA. Section 3.2, pp.182–183.

§ \tilde{v}_i is the estimated value of the *i*th alternative.

- Its cumulative probability distribution (cpd) is $F_i(v)$.
- All the \tilde{v}_i are statistically independent.

 $\S \widetilde{v}_{i^{\star}} = \max_i \widetilde{v}_i.$

Its cpd is G(v), derived as follows:

$$G(v) = \operatorname{Prob}(\widetilde{v}_{i^{\star}} \le v) \tag{5}$$

$$= \operatorname{Prob}(\widetilde{v}_1 \le v, \dots, \widetilde{v}_n \le v)$$
(6)

$$= \prod_{i=1}^{n} F_i(v) \tag{7}$$

§ If the \tilde{v}_i are i.i.d. with cpd F(v) and pdf f(v) then:

$$G(v) = [F(v)]^n \tag{8}$$

$$g(v) = \frac{\partial G}{\partial v} = n[F(v)]^{n-1}f(v), \text{ where } f(v) = \frac{\partial F}{\partial v}$$
 (9)

§ Now compare $E(\tilde{v}_{i^{\star}})$ and $E(\tilde{v}_{i})$ for i.i.d. case:

$$\mathbf{E}(\tilde{v}_{i^{\star}}) = \int vg(v) \,\mathrm{d}v \tag{10}$$

$$= \int v n [F(v)]^{n-1} f(v) \,\mathrm{d}v \tag{11}$$

$$\mathbf{E}(v_i) = \int v f(v) \, \mathrm{d}v \tag{12}$$

Thus:

$$E(\tilde{v}_{i^{\star}}) - E(v_{i}) = \int v[g(v) - f(v)] \, dv = \int v f(v) \left(n[F(v)]^{n-1} - 1 \right) \, dv$$
(13)

This integral is positive for $n \ge 2$, as we now explain intuitively.




Figure 4: Illustration of y_n .

§ Define $v^{(1)}$ as the value at which: $n[F(v^{(1)})]^{n-1} = 1$. This is also the value at which f(v) = g(v). See fig. 4.

- Hence: $F(v^{(1)}) = (1/n)^{1/(n-1)}$.
- Note that $n[F(v)]^{n-1} \leq 1$ iff $v \leq v^{(1)}$ because F(v) increases monotonically in v.
- Hence, from eq.(9), note that $g(y) \le f(v)$ for $v \le v^{(1)}$ as seen in fig. 4.
- Thus, since g(v) is normalized, it is shifted to the right wrt f(v).
- Thus, $E(\tilde{v}_{i^{\star}}) \geq E(\tilde{v}_{i})$.

1.4 Optimizer's Curse Theorem

Theorem 1 The expected regret from the estimated optimal alternative is non-negative. *Given:*

• $\tilde{v} = (\tilde{v}_1, \ldots, \tilde{v}_n)^T$ are noisy estimated values of n alternatives. These are random variables.

- The estimates are unbiased: $E(\tilde{v}_i|v) = v_i$.
- $v = (v_1, \ldots, v_n)^T$ are true values of n alternatives.
- $i^{\star} = \arg \max_{i} \widetilde{v}_{i}$ is the index of the most favorable estimate.

Then:

$$\mathcal{E}(\tilde{v}_{i^{\star}} - v_{i^{\star}}|v) \ge 0 \tag{14}$$

where the expectation is with respect to \tilde{v} conditioned on v.

Proof. Recall from eq.(4):

$$i^{\star} = \arg\max_{i} \widetilde{v}_{i} \tag{15}$$

Define $i' = \arg \max_i v_i$. Then:

$$\widetilde{v}_{i^{\star}} - v_{i^{\star}} \ge \widetilde{v}_{i^{\star}} - v_{i^{\prime}} \ge \widetilde{v}_{i^{\prime}} - v_{i^{\prime}} \tag{16}$$

- The left inequality is because $v_{i'} \ge v_{i^{\star}}$.
- The right inequality is because $\tilde{v}_{i^{\star}} \geq \tilde{v}_{i'}$.

Now take expectations of eq.(16) w.r.t. \tilde{v} , conditioned on v:

$$\mathbf{E}(\tilde{v}_{i^{\star}} - v_{i^{\star}}|v) \ge \mathbf{E}(\tilde{v}_{i^{\star}} - v_{i'}|v) \ge 0$$
(17)

- \bullet The 0 on the right is because the estimates are unbiased: $\mathrm{E}(\widetilde{v}_{i'}-v_{i'}|v)=0.$
- Eq.(17) implies eq.(14). ■

2 Info-Gap Analysis

§ Related material in "Lecture Notes on Robust-Satisficing Behavior", section 6: Probability of Success. File: lectures\info-gap-methods\lectures\rsb02.tex.

§ **Question:** Since $\tilde{v}_{i^{\star}}$ is unreliable (it has positive regret), what should we do?

§ A Potential answer. Bayesian analysis (Smith and Winkler, 2006):

- Posit prior probability for v, p(v), and conditional probability for \tilde{v} given v, $p(\tilde{v}|v)$.
- Use Bayes' rule to determine posterior probability of v given \tilde{v} : $p(v|\tilde{v})$.
- Choose alternative based on posterior means, $E(v_i|\tilde{v})$:

$$i^{\star} = \arg\max_{i} \mathcal{E}(v_{i}|\tilde{v}) \tag{18}$$

- Smith and Winkler (2006) show that this solution does not have the optimizer's curse!
- The problem: where do you get these pdf's?

§ A potential answer. Info-gap robust-satisficing:

- Satisfice the value: $v_i \ge v_c$. (We will find the regret entering later.)
- Maximize the robustness.

§ A potential answer. Info-gap opportune-windfalling:

- Windfall the value: $v_i \ge v_w$ where $v_w \gg v_c$.
- Maximize the opportuneness.

§ We will explore:

- Robust-satisficing.
- Proxy theorems.

2.1 Robustness: Formulation

§ **Observations:** known noisy estimated values of *n* alternatives: $\tilde{v} = (\tilde{v}_1, \ldots, \tilde{v}_n)^T$.

§ Uncertainty:

- Unknown true values of *n* alternatives: $v = (v_1, \ldots, v_n)^T$.
- $\mathcal{V}(h) = \text{info-gap model for } v. \text{ E.g.:}$

$$\mathcal{V}(h) = \left\{ v : \left| \frac{v_i - \tilde{v}_i}{s_i} \right| \le h, \ \forall i \right\}, \quad h \ge 0$$
(19)

Or:

$$\mathcal{V}(h) = \left\{ v : (v - \tilde{v})^T S^{-1} (v - \tilde{v}) \le h^2 \right\}, \quad h \ge 0$$
(20)

 \S **Decision:** *r* is the decision vector. E.g.:

- A standard unit basis vector, selecting a single alternative.
- An *n*-vector probability distribution selecting a randomized mix of alternatives.

§ Performance function. Value:

$$q(r,v) = r^T v \tag{21}$$

§ **Performance requirement.** Satisfice the value:

$$q(r,v) \ge q_{\rm c} \tag{22}$$

§ Robustness:

$$\widehat{h}(r, q_{\rm c}) = \max\left\{h: \left(\min_{v \in \mathcal{V}(h)} r^T v\right) \ge q_{\rm c}\right\}$$
(23)

2.2 Robustness: Simple Example

 \S We evaluate the robustness, eq.(23), with the info-gap model of eq.(19).

 \S Let $\mu(h)$ denote the inner minimum in eq.(23).

- $\mu(h)$ occurs when $r^T v$ is minimal.
- The elements of *r* are non-negative, so $\mu(h)$ occurs when each v_i is minimal:

$$\mu(h) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (\tilde{v}_i - s_i h) r_i$$
(24)

$$= r^T \tilde{v} - h r^T s \tag{25}$$

Equating this to q_c and solving for h yields the robustness:

$$\hat{h}(r, q_{\rm c}) = \frac{r^T \tilde{v} - q_{\rm c}}{r^T s}$$
(26)

or zero if this is negative.

 \S **Regret.** The numerator in eq.(26) is a regret:

- $r^T \tilde{v}$: expected outcome.
- q_c : required or critical or least acceptable outcome.
- Positive regret: critical outcome lower than expectation: $r^T \tilde{v} q_c > 0$.
- Zero regret has zero robustness. This is related to the zeroing property.
- Positive regret has positive robustness.

This is related to the trade off of robustness vs. performance.

§ **Preference reversal.** It is evident from eq.(26) that robustness curves of different decisions can cross one another.

2.3 Probability of Success and the Proxy Property

1

\S Probability of success:

- Define $q = r^T v$.
- $Q(h) = info-gap \mod for uncertainty in q.$
- Requirement: $q \ge q_c$.
- p(q|r) = pdf of q given r. This pdf is **unknown**.
- $P_{\rm s}(r, q_{\rm c}) =$ probability of satisfying the requirement with *r*:

$$P_{\rm s}(r,q_{\rm c}) = \operatorname{Prob}(q \ge q_{\rm c}) = \int_{q_{\rm c}}^{\infty} p(q|r) \,\mathrm{d}q \tag{27}$$

§ Probabilistic preferences:

$$r_1 \succ_p r_2$$
 if $P_s(r_1, q_c) > P_s(r_2, q_c)$ (28)

§ Robust-satisficing preferences:

$$r_1 \succ_r r_2$$
 if $\hat{h}(r_1, q_c) > \hat{h}(r_2, q_c)$ (29)

\S **Proxy Property:**

Definition 1 $Q_r(h)$ and P(q|r) have the **proxy property** at decisions r_1 and r_2 and critical value q_c , with performance function G(r, q), if:

$$\hat{h}(r_1, q_c) > \hat{h}(r_2, q_c)$$
 if and only if $P_s(r_1, q_c) > P_s(r_2, q_c)$ (30)

- The proxy property is symmetric between robustness and probability of success.
- We are particularly interested in the implication from robustness to probability.

• Thus, when the proxy property holds we will sometimes say that robustness is a proxy for probability of success.

• Sounds like a free lunch!

§ **Proxy theorem:** The proxy property holds if and only if the info-gap model and the probability distribution are "coherent". We will return to the idea of coherence in section 2.6.

¹Significant overlap between sections 2.3–2.6 here and section 6 in Lecture Notes on Robust-Satisficing Behavior, rsb02.tex.

2.4 Proxy Property: Simple Examples

 \S Before discussing coherence we examine simple examples of the proxy property, based on the simple example in section 2.2.

2.4.1 Normal Distribution

 \S Let $q = r^T v$ be normal:

$$q \sim \mathcal{N}\left[r^T \tilde{v}, \ (r^T s)^2 c^2\right]$$
(31)

where c > 0.

\S The probability of success, eq.(27), is:

$$P_{\rm s}(r,q_{\rm c}) = \operatorname{Prob}(q \ge q_{\rm c})$$
 (32)

$$= \operatorname{Prob}\left(\frac{q-r^{T}\tilde{v}}{(r^{T}s)c} \ge \frac{q_{c}-r^{T}\tilde{v}}{(r^{T}s)c}\right)$$
(33)

$$= 1 - \Phi\left(\frac{q_{\rm c} - r^T \tilde{v}}{(r^T s)c}\right) \tag{34}$$

$$= 1 - \Phi\left(-\frac{\hat{h}(r, q_{\rm c})}{c}\right) \tag{35}$$

where eq.(35) results from eq.(26). $\Phi(\cdot)$ is the cpd of the standard normal variable.

§ Proxy property holds.

- From eq.(35) we see that $P_{\rm s}(r, q_{\rm c})$ depends on r only through $\hat{h}(r, q_{\rm c})$.
- Hence eq.(35) implies eq.(30) and the proxy property holds.
- We only need to know that:
 - $\circ q$ is normal with mean $r^T \tilde{v}$.
 - \circ That c > 0. We needn't know the variance.

2.4.2 Uniform Distribution

\S Define uniform distributions as:

$$p(y|a,b) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{b-a} & \text{if } a \le y \le b\\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}$$
(36)

§ Suppose $q = r^T v$ is uniform, p(q|a, b), where:

$$a = r^T \tilde{v} - \frac{c}{2} r^T s \tag{37}$$

$$b = r^T \tilde{v} + \frac{c}{2} r^T s \tag{38}$$

where c > 0.

\S Probability of success, as in eqs.(32) and (33), is:

$$P_{\rm s}(r,q_{\rm c}) = \operatorname{Prob}(q \ge q_{\rm c})$$
 (39)

$$= \operatorname{Prob}\left(\frac{q - r^{T}\tilde{v}}{(r^{T}s)c} \ge \frac{q_{c} - r^{T}\tilde{v}}{(r^{T}s)c}\right)$$
(40)

 \S Define:

$$z = \frac{q - r^T \tilde{v}}{(r^T s)c} \tag{41}$$

which is uniform, p(z|a, b), with:

$$a = -\frac{c}{2} \tag{42}$$

$$b = \frac{c}{2} \tag{43}$$

 \S Now probability of success is analogous to eqs.(34) and (35):

$$P_{\rm s}(r,q_{\rm c}) = \operatorname{Prob}\left(z \ge \frac{q_{\rm c} - r^T \widetilde{v}}{(r^T s)c}\right)$$
 (44)

$$= 1 - P\left(\frac{q_{c} - r^{T}\widetilde{v}}{(r^{T}s)c}|a, b\right)$$
(45)

$$= 1 - P\left(-\frac{\hat{h}(r, q_{\rm c})}{c}|a, b\right)$$
(46)

where a and b are independent of r, eqs.(42) and (43).

\S Proxy property holds.

- From eq.(46) we see that $P_{\rm s}(r,q_{\rm c})$ depends on r only through $\hat{h}(r,q_{\rm c})$.
- Hence eq.(46) implies eq.(30) and the proxy property holds.
- We only need to know that:
 - $\circ q$ is uniform with mean $r^T \tilde{v}$.
 - \circ That c>0. We needn't know the variance.

2.5 Standardization and the Proxy Property

\S Probability of survival.

• Option *i* succeeds (survives) if its value is no less than the critical value:

$$v_i \ge v_c$$
 (47)

- $F_i(\cdot)$ denotes the cumulative probability distribution function of v_i .
- Probability of success for option *i* is:

$$P_{\rm s}(i) = {\rm Prob}(v_i \ge v_{\rm c}) = 1 - F_i(v_{\rm c})$$
 (48)

\S Standardization class of probability distributions:

Definition 2 Let q be a scalar random variable with a pdf that depends on parameters r. The pdf is **standardizable** and $\theta(q, r)$ is a **standardization function** if $\theta(q, r)$ is a scalar function which is strictly increasing and continuous in q at any fixed r and whose pdf is the same for all r.

§ Example:

- f(q|r) is a pdf of a random variable q, where r is a vector of parameters of the pdf.
- f(q|r) is a class of pdfs parametrized by r.
- Mean and variance of q are μ_q and σ_q^2 . E.g. $r = (\mu_q, \sigma_q^2)$.
- Standardized random variable, with pdf $g(\theta)$, is:

$$\theta = (q - \mu_q) / \sigma_q \tag{49}$$

• If $g(\theta)$ is independent of r then this is a standardization class. That is, if all the standardized random variables in the class have the same pdf, then this is a standardization class.

- Standardization classes are quite common:
 - \circ the normal, uniform, and exponential distributions all being examples.

 \circ The standardized distribution $g(\theta)$ may belong to the standardization class, e.g. normal and uniform, but this is not necessarily true, e.g. the exponential.

¶ Example: exponential distribution:

$$f(q|r) = re^{-rq}, \quad q \ge 0$$
 (50)

Moments:

$$\mathbf{E}(q|r) = \sigma(q|r) = \frac{1}{r}$$
(51)

Standardized variable:

$$\theta = \frac{q - \mathcal{E}(q|r)}{\sigma(q|r)} = rq - 1$$
(52)

Standardized density by probability balance:

$$q = \frac{\theta + 1}{r}, \quad \mathrm{d}q = \frac{1}{r}\mathrm{d}\theta \quad \Longrightarrow \quad g(\theta)\mathrm{d}\theta = f(q|r)\mathrm{d}q = \mathrm{e}^{-rq}r\mathrm{d}q = \mathrm{e}^{-(\theta + 1)}\mathrm{d}\theta, \ \theta \ge -1$$
(53)

Standardized density and cumulative distribution:

$$g(\theta) = e^{-(\theta+1)}, \ \theta \ge -1, \qquad G(\theta) = \int_{-1}^{\theta} g(z) \, dz = 1 - e^{-(\theta+1)}$$
 (54)

 $g(\theta)$ is a shifted exponential distribution.

¶ Proxy property: example.

- Suppose v_i and v_j both belong to the same standardization class.
- Their info-gap model is eq.(19), p.9, and robustness is eq.(26), p.10.
- Their standardization functions are:

$$\theta(v_i) = \frac{v_i - \tilde{v}_i}{cs_i} \tag{55}$$

where c > 0.

• $G(\theta) =$ cumulative probability distribution function of the standardized random variables.

• Probability of success for option *i* is:

$$P_{\rm s}(i) = \operatorname{Prob}(v_i \ge v_{\rm c}) = \operatorname{Prob}\left(\frac{v_i - \tilde{v}_i}{cs_i} \ge \frac{v_{\rm c} - \tilde{v}_i}{cs_i}\right)$$
(56)

$$= 1 - G\left(\frac{v_{\rm c} - \widetilde{v}_i}{cs_i}\right) \tag{57}$$

$$= 1 - G\left[-\frac{\hat{h}(i, v_{\rm c})}{c}\right]$$
(58)

where eq.(58) results from eqs.(57) and (26) if $v_{\rm c} \leq \widetilde{v}_i$.

• We see that:

$$P_{
m s}(i) > P_{
m s}(j)$$
 if and only if $\hat{h}(i, v_{
m c}) > \hat{h}(j, v_{
m c})$ (59)

• This example illustrates a general result:

Standardization implies that the proxy property holds.

• In order to calculate $\hat{h}(i, v_c)$ and hence maximize $P_s(i)$ we must be able to standardize the v_i 's, eq.(55).

• This requires knowing, for each *i*:

 $\circ \widetilde{v}_i = \text{mean.}$

- $\circ cs_i$ proportional to standard deviation.
- This does not require knowing:
 - \circ Value of c (actual standard deviations).
 - \circ Identify of pdf.

2.6 Coherence

§ Coherence:

- A weak informational-overlap between an info-gap model and a probability distribution.
- Coherence is necessary and sufficient for the proxy property to hold.
- \S Scalar uncertainty, q.
 - r is the decision vector.
 - E.g. $q = r^T v$.
 - $Q_r(h)$ is info-gap model for q.
 - P(q|r) and p(q|r) are cumulative prob distribution (cpd) and pdf for q.
 - G(r,q) is the performance function. Monotonic in q.
 - Define:

$$q^{\star}(h,r) \equiv \max_{q \in \mathcal{Q}_r(h)} q \tag{60}$$

$$q_{\star}(h,r) \equiv \min_{q \in \mathcal{Q}_r(h)} q \tag{61}$$

$$\mu(h) \equiv \min_{q \in \mathcal{Q}_r(h)} G(r, q)$$
(62)

- Define inverse of G(r,q), at fixed r, as follows.
- If G(r,q) increases as q increases:

$$G^{-1}(r, q_{\rm c}) \equiv \max\{q: \ G(r, q) \le q_{\rm c}\}$$
 (63)

If G(r,q) decreases as q increases:

$$G^{-1}(r, q_{\rm c}) \equiv \min \{q : G(r, q) \le q_{\rm c}\}$$
 (64)

Definition 3. $Q_r(h)$ and P(q|r) are **upper coherent** at decisions r_1 and r_2 and critical value q_c , with performance function G(r,q), if the following two relations hold for i = 1 or i = 2, and j = 3 - i:

$$P[G^{-1}(r_i, q_c)|r_i] > P[G^{-1}(r_j, q_c)|r_j]$$

$$G^{-1}(r_i, q_c) - q^{\star}(h, r_i) > G^{-1}(r_j, q_c) - q^{\star}(h, r_j)$$
for $h = \hat{h}(r_j, q_c)$ and $h = \hat{h}(r_i, q_c)$ (66)

 $Q_r(h)$ and P(q|r) are **lower coherent** if eqs.(65) and (66) hold when $q^*(h, r)$ is replaced by $q_*(h, r)$.

- Coherence implies "information overlap" between $Q_r(h)$ and P(q|r).
- Eq.(65) depends on P(q|r) but not on h or $Q_r(h)$.
- Eq.(66) depends on h and $Q_r(h)$ but not on P(q|r).

• Coherence implies that knowledge of one function reveals something about the other.

 \S Example. Following are coherent with G(r,q)=q/r:

$$P(q|r) = 1 - e^{-rq}$$
(67)

$$\mathcal{Q}_r(h) = \left\{ q: \ 0 \le q \le \frac{h}{r} \right\}, \quad h \ge 0$$
(68)

- As *r* increases, P(q|r) and $Q_r(h)$ both become more highly concentrated.
- Each reveals something about the other. There is some "coherence" between them.

§ **Example.** Following are **not** coherent with G(r,q) = q/r: Exponential distribution, eq.(67), and:

$$\mathcal{Q}_r(h) = \{q: \ 0 \le q \le rh\}, \quad h \ge 0$$
(69)

• As r increases, P(q|r) becomes more highly focussed while $Q_r(h)$ becomes more dispersed.

2.7 Coherence and the Proxy Property

 \S We now state and discuss an important theorem:

coherence is necessary and sufficient for the proxy property to hold.

Definition 4 An info-gap model, $Q_r(h)$, **expands upward continuously** at *h* if, for any $\varepsilon > 0$, there is a $\delta > 0$ such that:

$$|q^{\star}(h',r) - q^{\star}(h,r)| < \varepsilon \quad \text{if} \quad |h'-h| < \delta \tag{70}$$

Continuous downward expansion is defined similarly with $q_{\star}(\cdot)$ instead of $q^{\star}(\cdot)$.

We can now state a proposition.²

Proposition 1 Info-gap robustness to an uncertain scalar variable, with a loss function which is monotonic in the uncertain variable, is a proxy for probability of survival if and only if the info-gap model $Q_r(h)$ and the probability distribution P(q|r) are coherent. *Given:*

• At any fixed decision r, the performance function, G(r,q), is monotonic (though not necessarily strictly monotonic) in the scalar q.

- $Q_r(h)$ is an info-gap model with the property of nesting.
- r_1 and r_2 are decisions with positive, finite robustnesses at critical value q_c .

• $Q_r(h)$ is continuously upward (downward) expanding at $\hat{h}(r_1, q_c)$ and at $\hat{h}(r_2, q_c)$ if G(r, q) increases (decreases) with increasing q.

Then: The **proxy property** holds for $Q_r(h)$ and P(q|r) at r_1 , r_2 and q_c with performance function G(r,q).

If and only if: $Q_r(h)$ and P(q|r) are upper (lower) coherent at r_1 , r_2 and q_c with performance function G(r,q) which increases (decreases) in q.

²Yakov Ben-Haim, 2012, Robust satisficing and the probability of survival, *International Journal of System Science*, appearing on-line 9 May 2012. Link at: http://info-gap.com/content.php?id=11